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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AND
ITS LEGAL EFFECTS
(Continued) *
NONA B. FUMERTON

PROVISIONS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT
Acknowledging, then, that both employers and employees have legally
enforceable rights under these collective agreements, both groups are
naturally interested in determining the precise effect which the courts
will give to the various provisions of their agreements. If they are
allowed injunctions in certain cases, will the courts specifically enforce
a closed shop agreement? Or will the courts declare provisions for a
secondary boycott void? And these are only two of the myriad of
questions which arise out of the judicial attempts to construe these
contracts. So we now turn to a survey of the interpretations which
have been placed upon these agreements.
"Speaking generally, the tendency of the cases are definitely
in the direction of a broad and liberal construction of collective
bargaining agreements. * * * Decisions construing the agreements strictly are waning, and can no longer be relied upon as
good law in the face of general emphasis upon the beneficial
85
effects of collective bargaining."
Closed Skop Provisions:
One of the most vital problems confronting the courts today is the
interpretation to be put upon the stipulation for a closed shop which is
found in many collective agreements. This provision has been attacked
not only by employers, but also by non-union employees who are unable
to obtain work and by rival unions. It has been attacked on the
ground that it is contrary to public policy; that it constitutes an unlawful conspiracy and that it violates the anti-trust laws in general. Nonetheless, there has been a growing recognition of the validity of such
agreements."8
* The first installment of this article appears at 17 WASH. L. REv. 181.
: Teller, supra note 63, § 169.
8 Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 10; F. F. East Co., Inc. v. United Oystermen's
Union 19600 et al, supra note 84; Christiansen et al. v. Local 680, supra note
56; and In re Triboro Coach Corp., 104 N. Y. L. J. 807, 3 LABOR CASES
ff 60,076 (1940).
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The courts of the various jurisdictions have not all agreed, however,
in their approach to this problem. There is first the factor of the scope
and importance of the agreement in the labor market-that is, does the
agreement cover all of the possible sources of employment so that one
must be a member of the union in order to obtain work, or does the
union have as members the greater number of workers in the particular
field so that an employer must enter into a contract with the union
in order to get men? In some of the cases the courts have concluded
that the size of the union is not controlling. Thus, in F. F. East Co. Inc.
v. United Oystermen's Union, 7 the fact that 95 per cent of the entire
industry had signed closed shop agreements with the union was not
felt sufficient to make the contract there involved illegal. And in Farulla
v. Ralph A. Freundlick,8 8 an agreement was held not to be illegal per se
merely because 75 per cent of the employers in the industry, employing
2,000 of the 2,650 workers engaged therein, had entered into collective
agreements containing provisions for the closed shop.
However, not all courts have adopted this approach, and occasionally
a case will seem to turn upon the scope of the agreement within the
particular industry involved. In the Christiansen case,89 the court
adopted a rule of presumption to the effect that if the union has negotiated closed shop agreements throughout the entire industry it will
be assumed prima facie to have established a monopoly, and evidence
will have to be introduced in order to justify the agreements. On the
other hand, if such provisions merely prevail between one employer,
or only a few employers, and the union, then the closed shop provisions
will be presumed to be valid.
Occasionally the problem is presented in a more aggravated form,
as where a closed shop agreement completely ties up an essential and
important industry in an entire community, so that it is impossible for
anyone in that locality to obtain work in that industry unless he is
or becomes a member of the union. In such circumstances, the agreement has been declared to be void as against public policy, and there
would seem to be justification for such a holding in an extreme case of
this sort.90
S Supra note 84.
88 152 Misc. 761, 274 N. Y. S. 70 (1934).
89Christiansen et al. v. Local 680, supra note 56.
0 Polk v. Cleveland R. Co., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808 (1925); Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913). In a Note in 24 VA. L.
REV. 567 (1938), a New York case, Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E.
(2d) 547 (1938), is discussed. The case involved a closed shop agreement
between the local subway and elevated railway companies and the transport workers' union. The non-union workers complained that this created
a monopoly, since it included all the employers who furnished work of
that type in the community. The court upheld the agreement since nonunion workers could join the union and since it was to the benefit of the
employees. The author of the Note felt that this was an extension of the
doctrine as, applied by the majority of the cases but that it was justifiable
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It is also possible for the courts to consider the legality of such closed
shop provisions from the standpoint of whether they have the effect
of inconveniencing or injuring the employer. Thus in the F. F. East
Co. case discussed above, the court noted that the plaintiff employer's
business had not been inconvenienced or delayed by the closed shop
provision in its contract with the defendant union, since it was able to
hire non-union workers temporarily if it needed them and get them admitted to the union later. The court found that the union had entered
into the agreement in good faith for the benefit of its members and
other workers in the industry and therefore sustained the agreement.
Finally, it has been suggested that a distinction should be made in
those cases where the union bargaining for a closed shop is also a dosed
union." There is perhaps less justification for such a closed shop, dosed
union situation than for the simple closed shop agreement alone, but
even in this type of case, if the employer has not been injured through
inability to obtain workmen, and if the purpose of the agreement is
actually to aid the employees rather than to injure the employer, it
would seem difficult to find a basis for denying the validity of the
closed shop provision.
The National Labor Relations Board has adhered to the policy of
upholding the validity of dosed shop agreements, while state legislation
has been adopted authorizing the closed shop, and there is a growing
feeling that the strike for a closed shop is valid. All of these factors will
probably lend support to the contention that agreements containing
closed shop provisions are valid.
An interesting problem, collateral to the general question of the
validity of the dosed shop, arises when'the courts are called upon to
determine the rights of a workman who has been discharged or is
unable to obtain employment because of a closed shop agreement. Has
he the right to sue the union for damages on these grounds? The issue
is somewhat different than any of those which arise between the employer
and the union, since here the employee's right to work has been interfered with.
As long as there is no constitutional right to work-a highly controversial issue in itself-a man who merely finds it difficult to obtain
employment, but who has not lost his job as a consequence of the formation or existence of a closed shop agreement, will find it difficult to
discover any legal theory to sustain his a tion, unless it be upon the
ground that the dosed shop provision constitutes a monopoly or a
as long as the non-union worker could join the union, because of the importance to the union of the closed shop.
03Teller, supra note 63, §170. Also see Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99,
121 N. E. 790 (1919), which upheld the closed shop provision but noted
that the union wag an open union.
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restraint upon trade. These rationales have in fact been suggested as
possible approaches for the courts, their decision in each case to depend
upon whether or not the agreement has actually lessened the plaintiff's
92
opportunity for finding work.

An employee who has actually been discharged from his position
because of non-membership in a union having a closed shop contract
with his employer can advance a much more persuasive argument, since
his contract of employment has been directly interfered with. Such
a worker has, in some cases, been able to sustain his claim for damages
on the ground, apparently, that such closed shop agreements are void
as against public policy." However, not all cases have so held. In
Cusumano v. Schlessinger94 . . . the plaintiff non-union employee was

discharged by his employer at the instigation of an employers' association, of which the latter was a member, and of the union with which
the association had a closed shop contract. The employee then attempted
to sue the union on account of his discharge, but the court denied
recovery. The grounds upon which the decision was based are not entirely satisfactory, for the court adopted what appears to have been the
easiest way out, without actually considering the problem presented.
The contract of employment was held to be merely a contract terminable
at will, so that the employer had the right to discharge an employee
at any time and for any reason. Furthermore, the court felt that, even
had the employee been wrongfully discharged, his action against the
union would be improper, since the employer is solely responsible for
discharging him. Even an employee who has been expelled from a
union and then is unable to obtain work because the union has closed
shop agreements with the employers in the industry has been held to
be unable to obtain relief against the union. 95
It would seem that a rival union would have even less right to object
to the formation of a closed shop agreement between an employer and
another union. It is possible that if all the members of this rival union
were discharged as a result of such an agreement, they might be allowed
to bring suits individually in some jurisdictions, but the union itself
could not maintain an action, unless upon the theory of public policy
or on the ground that the agreement might result in a monopoly of
the labor market. The motive for forming the agreement is sometimes
given importance in this type of case, as well as the fact that the
members of the plaintiff union have not been discharged from work
but are merely unable to obtain employment. 96
9.-Witmer, supra note 33.
93Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297 (1897).
'490 Misc. 287, 152 N. Y. S. 1081 (1915).
Also see Ryan v. Hayes, 243
Mass. 168, 137 N. E. 344 (1922).
15 Shinsky v. O'Neil, supra note 91.
01 Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 166, 104 N. E. 717 (1914).
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Whether or not a closed shop agreement should be sustained in any
or all circumstances is solely a question of public policy, a question
of balancing the interests of the labor movement against the interests of
the public as a whole. It must be admitted that the closed shop agreement is of vital importance to any union group. It is the one certain
means of preserving the rights which the union has won for its members.
If we approve of collective bargaining and the right of workmen to
organize into labor unions, it would seem that we must also approve
of their ultimate goal of complete unionization, which can be effected
only through the establishment of the closed shop. Much of this discussion is, of course, now foreclosed by the recent decisions under the
anti-trust law. 97 Those cases have established, in the federal courts
at least, that closed shop agreements are not per se violations of the
Sherman Act, and it is to be presumed that most of the state courts
will adopt a similar attitude.
Seniority Provisions
While the advantage of the labor movement of judicial approval of
closed shop provisions in collective labor contracts cannot be denied,
seniority rights and their protection are also of great concern to the
union and the individual employee, and provisions with respect to
seniority usually constitute an important part of such a collective agreement. Very often it will be found that actions involving questions of
seniority are brought not only against the employer but against the
union as well, for a violation of seniority rights may be occasioned by a
change in the agreement between the union and the employer. The
result of the action will turn upon the interpretation given to the agreement by the court.
In considering this problem the courts seem willing to rely upon the
practical construction placed upon the seniority provisions by the
parties concerned, instead of attempting to determine for themselves
the purpose of these sections.98 Furthermore, most courts seem to
acknowledge the union's interest in the interpretation of the agreement
and therefore recognize its right to intervene in an action, even if not
joined as an original party. The union, as representative of its other
members, is regarded as having a valid interest in the proper interpretation of the contract.99
In the event that an individual employee sues for reinstatement or
for recognition of his seniority rights, he is clearly entitled to injunctive
97Altho important in themselves they fall outside of the scope of
this discussion.
go Burton v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. ,Co., 148 Ore. 648, 38 P. (2d)
72 (1934).
99 McGregor v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S. W. (2d) 953
(1932).
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relief if his rights have actually been denied. The problem arises in
determining whether or not his rights have been so disregarded. The
normal case is illustrated by Burton v. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay.
Co.100 in which the plaintiff employee sued for a declaratory judgment
as to his seniority rights, due to the consolidation of two divisions of
the railroad and the union's agreeing to a new consolidated seniority
list which altered the plaintiff's seniority status to his disadvantage.
The court denied that the contract had given the plaintiff employee
any vested right to seniority and refused the relief prayed for.
"When plaintiff entered the employment of the company, he
was bound to accept the schedule as it came to him, to be
read in the light of established practice and interpretation.
There could not be an interpretation for one employee and
a different interpretation for another. It applied to all employees alike. Any other conclusion would do violence to the
purpose and spirit of the collective bargaining agreements." 10
,
Similar results have been reached in other cases upon the general
theory that the union has the right and power to modify the agreement
for the benefit of its entire membership, even though this action may
0 2
injure the plaintiff individually.
An opposite conclusion has, however, been reached in some cases.
Under this view the seniority rights granted by the collective agreement
are held to vest in the employee so that they cannot be destroyed or
denied by the union or the employer without his consent. Thus in
Lockwood v. Chitwood 0 3 an employee sued to restrain the union from
interfering with his seniority rights. The court said:
"Contrary to defendants' contention, seniority rights, when
recognized and guaranteed by contract between the employer
and the union inure to the benefit of individual employees, and
the employee may invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts
if full resort to union tribunals has proved unavailing because
of unreasonable construction of union laws or want of good
faith on the part of such officers."' 4
It has likewise been recognized that an employee may restrain an
interference with his seniority rights by another union.10 5 Apparently
the courts are more willing to prevent an outside union or another employee from interfering with an employee's seniority status than they
are to restrain his own union from modifying the collective agreement
by which those rights were originally established.' 03 5
100 Supra note 98. See also, Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.
E. 705 (1934).
101 Supra note 98, at page 76.
102Hartley v. Brotherhood, supra note 34; Donovan v. Travers, supra
note 100.
103 185 Okla. 44, 89 P. (2d) 951 (1939). Relief was denied on the facts.
104 Supra note 103, at page 952.
105 Dooley et al. v. Lehigh Valley R. C., supra Note 26. Seniority rights
were here compared to unemployment insurance.
'105 For a general discussion of the problems in connection with seniority provisions, see Note (1941) 41 COL. L. RE.v. 304.
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Covenants Against Dealing With Non-Union Employers
Another very interesting provision which is sometimes found in
these collective labor agreements is a covenant by the employer not
to trade with other business organizations which are not unionized.
0°
Such a provision was interpreted in Weitzberg v. Dubinsky, in which
a manufacturer of buttons sued to restrain a union and an employers'
association from enforcing the following clause in their contract:
"Members of the association who purchase or cause to be
manufactured belts, covered, buttons, neckwear, artificial
flowers, embroideries, buckles, hemstitching, pleating and tucking on garments, shall deal only with such firms as are in
contractual relations with the union.
The defendant union had entered into this agreement with a number
of employers' associations, some of the members of which were customers of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had had a contract with the union,
but upon its expiration a controversy arose and the execution of a new
agreement was delayed. The defendant union threatened to enforce
the above provision against the plaintiff, which would have meant a loss
of customers, unless the plaintiff became a member of a particular
manufacturers' association from which he had earlier resigned. To
prevent such action, the plaintiff brought this suit. The court upheld
the validity of this clause as a logical and essential part of a collective
bargaining agreement and concluded that the fact that it inflicted harm
upon the plaintiff was not of legal significance. Futhermore, although
it did not regard the agreement as calling for a secondary boycott, it
indicated that even if it were so regarded, it would still be upheld as
legal under the earlier case of Goldfinger v. Feintuch.'06
A similar case- recently arose in this jurisdiction.10 7 The plaintiff
company had entered into an agreement with the defendant union
which contained a stipulation that:
"There shall be no goods delivered to, or sold at the plant
for resale from trucks to persons not in good standing with
Local Union No. 524."
The plaintiff, in violation of this contract, continued to sell to the
Paddy Kake Bakery Sales Company, which was not unionized. After
repeated but unavailing requests that the plaintiff cease dealing with
the non-union concern, the union began to picket the plaintiff employer.
The court, in an action for damages and injunctive relief, held that
this was not a secondary boycott and that there was no attempt to
intimidate the plaintiff's employees or customers. It concluded:
"The parties had the right to enter into the contract which
they executed and which by its terms, was still in effect
106 173 Misc. 350, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (1940).
106- 276 N. Y. 281, N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
1 07
Marvel Baking Company v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 524, 5 Wn.
(2d) 346, 105 P. (2d) 46 (1940).
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up to and including the time of the trial of this action. Respondent does not contend that, at the time the contract was
signed, it did not fully understand the meaning of the clause
of the contract above quoted. Respondent having breached this
provision of its contract, appellants had the right, by lawful
methods, to disseminate information to the effect that a dispute
existed between respondent and appellant union. The facts
that respondent's employees were all members of the union,
and that the parties to this action had entered into a contract
which was in full force and effect at the time the action was
commenced and when the action was tried, distinguish this
case from the Fornili case and other of our decisions relied
upon by respondent."' 08
Such provisions will not be enforced, however, if they run counter
to statutory provisions or definite public policy. Thus in the Keystone
Freight Lines case,' 09 the provision that "Members of the union shall
not be allowed to handle or haul freight to or from an unfair company" was held not to constitute a defense in an action brought by one
motor carrier against another for unfair discrimination in refusing to
accept goods for carriage.
But, except in unusual fact situations such as that involved in the
Keystone case, if the secondary boycott itself is recognized as legal
in a given jurisdiction, there seems to be no reason why it may not be
expressly provided for in a collective bargaining contract.
Ml'iscellaneous Provisions
Another provision sometimes found in collective bargaining agreements entered into between a union and an employers' association is
a stipulation to the effect that there shall only be one agreement within
the particular industry, and that with the association which is a party
to the given contract." 0 These provisions have usually been sustained
on the rationale that the union has an interest in bargaining collectively
with only one group and that it is to its advantage to bargain with
an employers' association because of the disciplinary force which the
latter can exert over its members."' The desire of other employers
not to be subjected to undercutting of wages by an unfair employer
will do much to aid in the enforcement of such conditions.
This same rationale was relied upon to uphold another type of agreement entered into by a jobbers' association, the union, and various
contractors in the dress manufacturing industry. The jobbers' association ... agreed to deal only with those contractors whom they actually
needed and who were certified to them in the manner provided in the
108 Ibid. p 358.
1OKeystone Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pratt Thomas Truck Lines, Inc. (W.
D. Okla., 1941) 3 LABOR CASES ff 60,254.
lio See American Fur Manufacturers' Assn., Inc. et al. v. Association
Fur Coat & Trimming Mfg., Inc., 161 Misc. 246, 291 N. Y. S. 610 (1936).
The decision in this case was influenced somewhat by the state anti-trust
law.
"' Teller, supra note 63, § 174.
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agreement. The contractors were to manufacture exclusively for the
'jobbers to whom they were certified, and both the jobbers and thg
contractors were to employ only union men. The contractor who brought
this suit to have this provision declared void, had been designated to
certain jobbers who no longer had enough work to hire him, and other
jobbers were unwilling to employ him unless he were designated to
them. The court rendered judgment for the defendants on the pleadings
and stated:
"Obviously, in an industry comprised of small units of employers effective collective agreement can be obtained only if
the trade union deals with the employers through an association. This method of dealing has the advantage of avoiding
a multiplicity of negotiations at every step and enabling a
better enforcement of, and respect for, the very collective agreement not alone by the union, but through the discipline which
the association exercises upon its individual members."11 2
There are numerous other clauses in the normal collective bargaining
agreement which are of great importance in connection 'with the effort
'to maintain industrial peace, such as clauses providing means of settling disputes through arbitration and stipulations against strikes and
lockouts. Most of these provisions have been upheld, and since it is
impossible successfully to analyze all of them here, they will not be
discussed. 13
THE EFFECT OF THE ANTI-INJUNCTIoN ACTS
Today the problem of the validity of the collective bargaining agreement and the means of enforcing it has become more complicated
because of the effect of the anti-injunction acts, modeled after the
national Norris-LaGuardia Act, and fair labor practices acts similar to
the Wagner Act. Although these questions cannot be discussed here
in detail, still no consideration of the legality of the collective labor
contract would be complete without some reference to them.
In determining whether or not the anti-injunction statutes impinge
upon the right of the parties to obtain specific performance of such an
agreement, or to restrain a breach thereof, the initial inquiry is whether
or not a controversy arising out of a labor agreement is a labor dispute
within the meaning of the statutes so that, in the first instance, these
enactments can be held to be applicable.
A labor dispute is defined in the majority of the acts in terms similar
to the following:
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the
S12Sainer v. Affiliated Dress Manufacturers, Inc. et al., 168 Misc. 319
5 N.Y. S. (2d) 855, 859 (1938).
11 The problem of enforcing a union's covenant not to strike has already been discussed. For a case in -this jurisdiction which involved an
arbitration agreement between the employer and the union, see Hegeberg
v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wn. (2d) 509, 110 P. (2d) 182 (1941).
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association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and
1 4
employee. The question actually becomes one, then, of applying the statutory
definition to the facts of a "breach of the agreement" case. Some
of the state courts have concluded that a controversy over the terms
of the agreement or an attempt to enforce compliance therewith is a
labor dispute." 5 The Washington court in the Marvel Baking Co. case"'
seems also to accede to this view, although the position is not entirely
clear, since a majority of the employees were members of the union
which was striking and picketing, and this fact was also relied upon
by the court to sustain its position. However the court did state:
"The Fornili case and decisions of this court upon which
the same was based hold that no labor dispute exists in cases
where a union pickets an employer, when none of the employees belongs to the union which is engaged in the picketing, and where no employee has any dispute with his employer as to the terms and conditions of his employment.
In none of our cases above cited did it appear that the employer had an existing contract of any kind with the union
and consequently could be charged with violation of any
agreement.""17 (italics added)
This case is also of importance since the provision in the contract
which was breached did not relate to what are usually referred to
as the terms or conditions of employment (and in fact the employees
were satisfied with their working conditions), but rather with the
employer's refusal to comply with a covenant against trading with an
unfair, non-union company. Therefore, it would seem, under the reasoning of this court, that a dispute arising over the breach of any
clause in the contract would constitute a labor dispute under the
statute. It should be noted, however, that the action was not directly
to enforce the agreement, but was, rather, an attempt to recover
damages and to enjoin picketing by the union which declared the company unfair because of its breach of the contract.
There is a paucity of federal cases upon this subject, although
there are cases which have held that a strike or boycott in violation
I'29 U. S. C. A. § 113 (c).
115
Greater City Master Plumbers' Assn., Inc. v. Kahme, supra note 69.
Also cf. Foss v. Portland Terminal Co., 287 Fed. 33 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923):
Lesaius v. The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Motion Picture Operators, etc., 4 LABOR CASES ff 60,503 (Penn., 1941). The
writers upon the subject seem to feel that such a controversy is a labor
dispute. See Teller, supra note 63 § 177 and 51 HARV.L. REv. 520, supra note
79.
16Supra note 107.
117 Ibid, p. 353.
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of the terms of a contract is also a labor dispute and not enjoinable." 8
In Foss v. Portland Terminal Co."' a similar problem was considered
in relation to Section 20 of the Clayton Act. The plaintiff carrier
sought to enjoin the calling of a strike by a union contrary to the terms
of their- collective agreemeht, which provided for arbitration. The difficulty arose over wages, and before it could be submitted to a conference for settlement the union distributed ballots to determine
whether the workers would authorize the calling of a strike unless the
management granted immediate reconsideration of the wage reduction
and settled the problem of overtime. The court denied the injunction,
even though it assumed that the strike would violate the union's contract, and specifically held, inter alia, that this was a dispute concerning conditions of labor.
After determining that a labor dispute does exist, it is still necessary
to determine whether or not equitable relief by way of injunction will
be denied, or whether it is possible to bring the action within one of
the exceptions provided for in the act. This was attempted in the Foss
case, and the employer asserted that the particular circumstances came
within the terms "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
property or to a property right." The court concluded, however, that
the mere fact of quitting work was not the type of -injury contemplated
by the statute and that the employer had therefore failed to bring
himself within the exception.
Under the state acts the problem is simplified because many of
them have specific provisions to the effect that the act shall not apply
to any case involving a labor dispute which is in disregard of a valid
labor agreement. This is true in New York and also in Pennsylvania,
and in both states the courts have allowed the employer to obtain an
1 20
injunction against the union to prevent striking and picketing.
Under the national act, however, there is
means that any employer or union seeking
to comply with the general exemptions. It
the position of the union will be somewhat
employer. It will be possible for the union

no such provision, which
equitable relief will have
has been suggested that
simpler than that of the
to show that the acts of

11 sTeller, supra note 63 § 177, where the author stated that he had
found no federal case passing upon the right to obtain specific performance
of these agreements as affected by the Anti-Injunction Law.

." Supra note 115.

Greater City Master Plumbers' Assn., Inc., supra note 69, where a
New York court enjoined a strike by a union in violation of its agreement. The court apparently felt that the act applied to this type of
situation, but that, since it qualified under the exception of "breach of a
contract not contrary to public policy," the court had power to grant the
injunction. The Lesauis Case, supra note 115, involved picketing by a
rival union, but the court allowed an injunction to protect the existing
labor contracts.
120
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the employer in violating the agreement are unlawful or will cause
irreparable injury to property, while an employer attempting to restrain a strike in breach of the agreement will have to circumvent
121
the express statutory provision against enjoining strikes.
The problem of the applicability of these statutes cannot be solved
merely by a technical determination of the meaning of their terms
and a literal enforcement thereof. It can be solved, rather, only upon
the basis of the broad general policy of such acts. If specific enforcement of the collective agreement is to be denied, and an injunction to
restrain the breach thereof refused, on the ground that a labor dispute
is involved within the terms of the statute, then the efficacy of the
collective labor agreement will be destroyed. As has already been
noted, damages and actions at law afford small compensation for the
loss suffered as a result of the breach of such a contract. It is only
through equitable relief that the value of the agreement can be fully
realized and protected. Therefore, to deny both parties the opportunity
of invoking the assistance of equity in maintaining and enforcing these
agreements is to render ineffective the collective bargain itself. Such
a result is clearly contrary to the general policy of all modern labor
legislation, since it is all predicated upon the encouragement of the
collective bargain as the most logical method of establishing labor
peace.
Furthermore, if the legislative intention in passing the anti-injunction laws is truly ascertained, it will be found that the purpose of such
legislation was not to impede the enforcement of collective labor
agreements, but to deal with an entirely different phase of labor disputes.122 These statutes were enacted primarily to prevent employers
from resorting to the courts to enjoin strikes for union recognition,
for the improvement of working conditions, and for other similar
labor objectives. They were not intended to apply to actions brought
to enforce the agreements which are the proper culmination of union
labor's efforts to gain recognition.
Since the courts apparently feel it necessary to hold that these
acts apply even to cases involving controversies arising out of collective agreements, and since it is highly desirable that equitable relief
be afforded in such cases, it would seem advisable that these statutes
be amended by exempting from their application cases involving the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE

N. L. R. A.

Assuming that a valid contract has been entered into between a
union and an employer, its continued effectiveness now would seem
to depend in some degree upon the interpretation of the National Labor
121
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51 HARv. L. REV. 520, supra note 79.
Teller, supra note 63, § 177.
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Relations Act. If the normal case. of a closed shop agreement is considered, the contract having been made between the majority union
and the employer, difficulty is encountered upon the employees'
changing their affiliation to another union, so that the once dominant
labor organization no longer maintains its majority status. Will the
employer be compelled to discharge all of his employees in order to
carry out his closed shop agreement with the old majority union, or
must he begin to bargain with the newly designated representative
of his employees? The employer is placed in a very hazardous position,
for he faces the possibility, upon one hand, of being sued for breach
of contract, and on the other, of being charged with an unfair labor
practice.
A fact situation falling within the general problem outlined above
was presented to both the Board and the court in M. & M. Woodworking Co. v. N. L. R. B.123 Local No. 2531 of the Carpenters' Union, an
A. F. of L. organization, had a contract with the employer -which designated it as the bargaining agent. The majority of the members of
this local, during the summer of 1937, determined to severe relations
with the Carpenters' Union and affiliate with the International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., whereupon they returned their 'original
charter to the Carpenters' Union. The employer, because of this shift
of affiliation by his employees, temporarily shut down his plant. Upon
reopening, he rehired only those employees who were members in good
standing of the formerly dominant union. The rival union brought an
unfair labor practice proceeding, .because of the employer's refusal
to employ workers unless they were in good standing with Local 2531.
The board held that the refusal to hire the discharged workers was an
unfair practice. It suggested that it was unnecessary to decide which
theory actually applied since the result would be the same either on
the theory that the new union was substituted for the old local and
took over its obligations and privileges, or under the theory that the
contract itself was terminated upon the shift in the membership in the
union. However, this decision was reversed by the circuit court,
which felt that the employer was justified in this action under the
1 23
terms of the contract. a

This variance between the approach of the court and that of the
Board illustrated by this case represents a fundamental divergence in
opinion between the .administrative and the judicial interpretations
of the act. The approach of the Board had apparently been one of
allowing a substitution of the new union for the old. Thus the closed
shop provisions would operate in favor of the presently dominant
12 6 Decisions and Orders of the N. L. R. B. 372 (1938),
reversed in
101 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
1-2"The problem was made more difficult because of the question
whether the local could withdraw from the national organization in the
manner it did.
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union. Although this was assumed to be the official position of the
Board, law review writers have suggested that the position is not now
so definite.1"' But nevertheless the Board's approach has been one
of allowing either termination or substitution in this sort of a situation.
The courts, on the other hand, have been more impressed with the
inviolability of the contractual rights, and thus have applied the normal
rules of contracts with apparent disregard of the peculiar nature of the
problems confronting them.
The problem becomes even more acute, if the rival union is certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the proper bargaining
agency. From the terms of the act itself it would appear that the
mere existence of an agreement between the employer and a formerly
dominant union would not remove the duty of the Board to certify
a new union as representative if it now has a majority, and it is asserted that there has never been a refusal of certification after the
initial year of the contract, although during that year the right has
been held to be barred. 125 Therefore, it would seem proper for the
Board to certify a union as bargaining representative even though an
agreement exists between the employer and another union.
This position has not been accepted in New York, under that state's
labor relations act, and in the Triboro Coach Corporation case,12a the
language of the opinion seemed to deny the right to issue a certificate
of representation during the life of a contract.
Once the Board has issued its certification, however, there still remains the question as to its effect upon the prior legal contract. Is
that contract automatically terminated, or does it continue with the
new union as a party? The New York cases have assumed that the
contract must continue between the employer and the old union, and
the change in proper bargaining agent cannot alter the contractual
121

Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465.

12- Teller, supra note 63, § 177; 51

YALE L. J. 465, supra note 124.
See also: In re Mill B. Inc., et al., 40 N. L. R. B. No. 346 April, 1942.
(One year contract with an A. F. of L. Union with automatic renewal
clause unless sixty day notice of desire to terminate was given. C. I. 0.,
after renewal, petitioned the Board for an investigation and certification
of representation. Agreement held a bar. C. I. 0. union should have given
notice prior to date of automatic renewal.);
In re Simon Bache & Co. and Local 528, Brotherhood of Painters.
Decorators and Paper Hangers of America, 39 N. L. R. B. No. 1216, March,
1942. (Contract entered into in October, 1938 and was to remain in effect
until December 31, 1943. It had been in effect at least three years at this
time. Held no bar to certification.);
In re Robert L. Nelson Co., Inc. v. United Paper Workers Union, Local
292, C. I. 0., 39 N. L. R. B. No. 1168, 1942. (A contract with an A. F. of L.
union was entered into after notice to the company of C. I. 0. Union's
claim to majority representation and after preceeding for selection of
representative was instituted. Held no bar.) Also see Note (1942) 40 MICH.
L. REV. 1249.
12,In re Triboro Corporation, 104 N. Y. L. J. 807, 3 LABOR CASES q 60,076
(1940).
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duties of the parties to the original contract. 12 7
Labarge v. Malone Aluminum Corp.'28 illustrates the reverence with
which the courts have treated the employer's obligations. There existed
a collective agreement between the employer and the Malone Independent Union, which was valid when made. Subsequent to that time, an
election was held and an A. F. of L. union was chosen by the employees
as their bargaining agent. This union also made a contract with the
employer which operated to the detriment of the Malone Independent
Union. This latter group sued to enjoin the breach of its prior collective bargaining contract. It was argued by way of defense that the
N. L. R. B. actually had sole jurisdiction of this controversy because it
had held an election to determine the representative union. The court
dismissed this contention and stated:
"The initial contract in question, between members of a
union and their employer, established property which the
court should not surrender to a board whose authority to
invalidate them has not been specifically given." 12 9
Thereupon the court issued an injunction restraining the enforcement of the new contract and ordering enforcement of the earlier
agreement.
The Triboro Case presents a similar approach in even more extreme
circumstances. There the employer had entered into a valid closed
shop agreement with an A. F. of L. union and upon the approach of the
date of its termination, a union affiliated with the C. I. 0. petitioned
the New York Board for an election. But the employer concluded a
new contract with the former union despite this petition and despite
a Board order calling for an election. The agreement had contained
an automatic renewal clause. An election was held after the contract
was concluded and the new union was selected as bargaining agent by
a majority of the employees. The employer refused to negotiate with
it, however, relying upon the prior contract for a closed shop. The
board issued a cease and desist order and the company appealed from
that order. The courts reversed the Board on the appeal, holding that
the contract was valid when made and that since the purpose of the
act was to prevent industrial strife, a valid contract could not be
overthrown merely on a change of bargaining agent. This case has
been interpreted as standing for the proposition that a closed shop
clause automatically designates the contracting union as the employees'
representative and that this fact can not be altered by an administra127 Supra note 126; also see Labarge et al. v. Malone Aluminum Corp.
et al., 3 LAnon CASES IT60,032 (1940). Teller also feels that there is nothing
in the N. L. R. A. which would necessitate a holding that the existing
contract is invalidated upon the new certification.
128 Supra note 127.
'129 Ibid.
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tive notice of the pendency of a representation question. 130
N. L. R. B. v. Electric Vacuum Co. 131 is a similar holding in relation
to the national act. The case arose out of a C. I. O.-A. F. of L. controversy. A written contract had been executed by the A. F. of L.
union and the employer. At the same time there was an oral agreement
that all new employees should become members of the A. F. of L. union
after two weeks probation. Only the old employees were exempt. Both
contracts were renewed for one year, and the workers designated the
A. F. of L. as their bargaining agent, subject to a thirty day notice of
withdrawal. Thereafter, C. I. 0. organizers began to obtain memberships for their union. Various difficulties arose, and the A. F. of L.
asked the employer to shut down his plant. This was done, following
which a new closed shop contract was entered into, and at the reopening
of the plant, only A. F. of L. members were rehired. The C. I. 0.
applied to the N. L. R. B., and the Board found that the employer had
discriminated in favor of the A. F. of L. .union. Although there was
some question raised as to whether the appropriate notice had been
given to all the employees of the oral agreement of preferential hiring,
the interpretation placed by the court on this provision and on the
designation of the A. F. of L. as bargaining representative is the interesting and important fact. The court held that the union members
could not terminate their membership during the year except by notice
of withdrawal of representation as provided in the agreement.
"* * * If the one-year term limits the freedom of the employees at will to discard membership in one union for membership in another, the limitation has been freely agreed to
by the men themselves, and the right to organize with representatives of their own choosing is curtailed not by the employer, but by their own valid agreement." 132
The problem is one of great importance not only to employees and
employers, but to the public as a whole. The general aim of all recent
legislation has been to bring about greater industrial peace; and it
has been deemed desirable to have terms of employment definite and
certain. There is therefore some validity to the court's position that
the contract should continue in effect despite the change in bargaining
agent. "' 3 On the other hand, the Wagner Act aims at flexibility and
true representation of the majority of the workers. Therefore it should
be possible for them, if dissatisfied, to change their union affiliations.
Clearly, it should not be justifiable for one union to enter into a
closed shop agreement extending over an indefinite number of years
which would effectively preclude any other union's certification as
Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 465.
1' 120 F. (2d) 611 (C. A. A. 6th, 1941).
12 Ibid. p. 616.
1"" Note
(1940) 38 MICH. L. REv. 516.
130
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bargaining representative. To insure democratic control of labor organizations, employees must be free to change their representatives.
The rights of the employer must also be considered. If he has a
duty to bargain with the union selected by the majority of his workers,
then he should be relieved of his contractual duties to any other union
with which he may have contracted previously. Also, it must be recognized that there is a great deal of validity in many of the contentions
advanced by employers in favor of the continuance of an existing
agreement with an old union. Particularly is this true of their arguments
against the doctrine of substitution. The employer has entered into a
contract with a particular union, relying upon its dependability in
carrying out the terms of the agreement. He might have been unwilling
to formulate a similar contract with the now majority union. To him,
substitution offers no relief, and possibly it may be to his disadvantge.
Nor is a complete abrogation of the agreement any more satisfactory,
since it destroys any gain which the employer may have obtained in
34
the way of certainty of labor conditions.1
The criticism has been made that the courts in resolving this problem have viewed the union as the real party in interest. On that basis,
abrogation of the existing contract would require either a dissolution
of the old union or a merger into another organization unless an assignment of the contract rights or a novation can be proved. But actually, it is contended, the workers themselves are the real parties in
interest, and it is suggested that they be treated as an entity. Therefore, if the workers have won certain rights and advantages while members of an A. F. of L. union, and a majority of them thereafter shift to
a C. I. 0. union, the entity, i. e., the majority of the workers, should
be allowed to retain those preferences and rights. 35
This suggestion is valid to an extent, since actually it is the employees
who are to be benefited by these agreements. But it is not a complete
solution as it leaves unsolved the problem already discussed in connection with the doctrine of substitution. The employer who has contracted with an A. F. of L. union may rely not only upon the local
union but upon the international union as well. It is just to require
him to look solely to his.employees and the local union for performance
of the contract?
The suggestion has also been repudiated by certain writers who are
of the opinion that the rights created by collective labor agreements
are not given to workers as such, but to workers who are members of
a particular union, so that the rights belong actually to that union
and its members and not to the individual employees considered apart
from their union membership.1
231

Supra note 130.

36

(1940) 38 MiCn. L. REv. 516.
Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39 M1wIcm L. REv. 1109 (1941).
2 Note
130
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None of these problems can be easily answered since they involve
a balancing of the interests of the three groups, the public, the workers,
and the employers. It seems reasonable to require that the contract
should continue for one year, during which time it should be a bar
to certification of another union as bargaining agent. After that time
the employees should be free to select a new representative if they so
desire. After a certification of the new bargaining agency, the old contract should continue in force under the substitution doctrine only
so long as is necessary for the new agent and the employer to reach
a satisfactory agreement. Upon the execution of the new contract, the
former agreement should be automatically revoked. This offers a continuity in labor conditions so that the public will not suffer by reason
of unnecessary labor disputes, the employees will be assured of having
a union which truly represents them, and the employer will have an
opportunity of modifying the agreement to the extent that he feels
necessary because of the change in affiliation of his workers. Difficulties will remain, of course, if the new union and the employer are unable to agree on a collective bargain, in which event the old contract
will continue with the new union substituted for the old.
All of this discussion has turned upon the hypothesis that the
original contract was valid. Of course, that is not always the case.
The agreement may be with a company union or a minority organization, or may be the result of some unfair labor practice. These problems must be left to be dealt with directly in a discussion of unfair
labor practices under the N. L. R. A., and it is sufficient to note here
that if such facts are proved the validity of the bargain itself will be
doubtful.
There still remains one question to be mentioned, and that is
whether a collective agreement may be enforced through resort to
the National Labor Relations Board. It has been argued that the
purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was merely to protect and
assure the right of collective bargaining. Under this doctrine, once the
employer and the union have settled their differences and formulated
an agreement the work of the Board is concluded. This exact question
was presented to the court in the Newark Morning Ledger case.137
The contract there in question contained a provision against discharge
of employees because of union activities. The agreement was a valid
collective bargain. Upon the discharge of an employee for alleged
union activities an action was brought against the employer before
the Board charging it with an unfair labor practice. The importance
of the case lies in its holding as to the jurisdiction of the Board and
the right of the public to prevent unfair labor practices, although to do
137 N. L. R. B. v. Newark Morning Ledger, 120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1941). Note (1941) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. 295.

1943]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

so incidentally protects a private right which could be enforced
through judicial proceedings. But for our purposes, the result is of
interest, for the court held the employer's action to be an unfair labor
practice. While a breach of just any clause of a labor contract will not
confer jurisdiction on the Board, since a breach of the contract is not
in itself an unfair practice under the federal law, the case does signify
that certain clauses, if breached, may be enforced indirectly through
proceedings before the Board. At times this will be of great importance
to the employee-for example, if he resides in a jurisdiction which
follows the rule that there must be an express adoption or ratification
of the agreement by the employee before he can avail himself of its
provisions, and he had not made any such ratification, he may still
enforce parts of the collective contract in his behalf by resort to the
N. L. R. B. Furthermore, proceedings before the Board may often be
the only adequate relief, since an award of damages would not compensate for the rights lost. 138
CONCLUSION

Today the effect given to the collective contract is much more
complete than that given to the collective gentlemen's agreement of
a few decades ago. The tendency of the modem cases is toward the
recognition of a valid contract between the union and the employer,
but creating rights in the individual employee as well. The old theories
of agency and usage are being applied less frequently as the third
party beneficiary doctrine is accorded greater acceptance. But it is still
necessary to evaluate this contractual approach to determine if that is
the desired solution. 3 9
The failure of the contract rationale to solve the difficulties of modification, to impose liabilities upon a third party beneficiary, or to
138 Note (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 501.
See also, In re Lehrman et al., 5 LABOR CASES II 60, 756 (Penn., 1941)
This was a state court decision where it was said in reference to the problem of breach of contract and unfair labor practices:
"While the Board has no jurisdiction to enforce the contract its power

to deal with the unfair labor practice is exclusive, even though an action
for breach of contract may be brought in the courts at the same time."
The court concluded that the breach of the contract of itself was not
sufficient to give the Board jurisdiction, unless the act complained of was
also an unfair labor practice.
130 "Collective agreements were conceived to meet adequately the needs
of a new social situation and are sui generis. They involve a three-party
or four-party relationship, with some of the parties having a shifting personnel of many individual members. The common law was never designed to govern multiple-party relationships, nor did it contemplate
jurisitic personality with a shifting membership other than by incorporation. It is apparent, therefore, that an attemped application of two-party
contract rules with the rights and duties flowing therefrom is fraught
with insurmountable difficulties when applied to a social situation involving multiple party relationship." Anderson, Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 15 ORE. L. REv. 229, 250 (1936).
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answer the troublesome questions raised by the National Labor Relations Act has been noted. And there are other circumstances in which
the doctrine has failed to act as an effective cure-all for our labor
problems. There is a need, then, for something additional, for a new
approach to protect the rights of all the interested parties.'
Various suggestions have been made as to the proper solution. The
possibility has been mentioned of treating the agreement between the
union and the employer as a contract, which in turn creates a usage
which enters into the individual employee's contract of employment.
This provides a sufficient theoretical basis for the recognition of both
the individual and collective rights created by the agreement. 4 '
The analogy between a collective agreement and a minimum wage
law offers another possible theory, similar in many respects to the
one just mentioned. Like the "contract-usage blend" it too treats the
agreement as a contract between the union and the employer, but the
benefits thereof are automatically given to the employee who has
no power under this theory to modify or waive them. It is in this latter
respect that the two suggestions differ.
Following the lead of several foreign countries, there are also proponents of the doctrine of giving a normative effect to the collective
bargain. 14 2 Although perhaps differing in terminology from the minimum wage approach, the result is almost identical. The employee is
unable to modify the collective bargain, and the right to contract
separately is limited thereby. This view is suggested in the following language from the Christiansen case:
"The contract between employer and union not only enters
into the individual contract, but it circumscribes the rights
of the employer and the members of the union with respect to
making individual contracts of employment. It creates legal
rights and duties which are independent of particular
hirings."14 3
It may be contended that the collective agreement is a new type
of relationship which can not be confined successfully within the
bounds of common law concepts and terminology. The interpretation
of the agreement should be flexible so that in each case the true intent
and purpose of the contract can be effected. Perhaps, then, the
courts should not attempt any rationale or set legal analysis to determine the validity of such agreements, but should, instead, strive in
each case to carry out the purposes of the bargain. 4 4 The normative
11o
Note (1931) 31 COL. L. PRsv. 1156, where the writer suggests that the

third party beneficiary doctrine is the best approach and that the courts
should not attempt to apply new concepts to this problem.
"'"Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1221.
142 Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 695.
1,Supra note 56, at p. 171.
1" Suggested in 15 ORE. L. REv., supra note 139.
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rule or the minimum wage analogy seem to come closest to reaching
the ideal solution. It is true that the individual right to contract is
greatly limited by either approach, but that merely amounts to a
surrender of a theoretical right in return for greater collective strength.
Since our national policy has been to favor the execution of these
agreements, and since economic peace is more easily assured through
their recognition and enforcement, the courts, it would seem, would
be amply justified in adopting either of these two approaches. The
benefit to the worker can not be doubted, and the savings to the employer and to the nation as a whole through the elimination of industrial strife should provide sufficient impetus toward cutting through
the limitations of strict and technical legal reasoning and giving to
these agreements the fullest measure of recognition and support.

